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Final Issues for Review 
Appellant briefed six (6) i ssues to the Court of Appeals in his brief: 
1. Can a jury demand be considered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, or 
mechanically waved through action of law, when: 
a. the jury demand was properly requested in the initial filing of the 
complaint; 
b. prior counsel for appellant paid all the fees as requested by the clerk of 
courts; 
c. prior counsel for appellant informed appellant that jury demand had been 
properly made; 
d. court first informed the appellant, now pro se, at the first hearing scheduled 
on the matter that the jury fee had not been recorded; 
e. demand for jury was renewed and paid prior to scheduling for trial and 5 
months prior to the trial; and 
f. interlocutory stay and appeal were applied for to challenge the denial of 
jury trial? 
2. Whether party pro se can be granted trial by jury? 
3. Whether one private party can sue another private party for malicious 
prosecution? 
4. Whether a defaulting party can effectually be found to have rebutted a prima facie 
case based on a non-defaulting party? 
5. Ineffective Counsel 
6. Whether a Court's finding of "no cause of action" is sufficient findings of facts 
and conclusions of law to specially constitute the grounds of its action. 
Appellees responded with two (2) additional issues: 
1. Did Appellant fail to fulfill his duty to Marshal the evidence in this case in order 
to successfully challenge a lower courts factual findings? 
2. Are the Appellees entitled to an award of double costs and attorney's fees? 
Appellants Reply 
I ask you honorable Judges where has our court system taken us over the year if 
the Appellees and their attorneys are full of lies and withhold information to hamper the 
outcome of the trial? If these are the "new" tactics to be used by lawyers in the Utah 
Fourth District to gain advantage in Family Courts for divorce and child custody matters, 
then there is indeed a serious flaw in the judicial system down here. Let this case stand, 
and you will be sending a clear message to this Fourth District that every attorney in a 
divorce and custody matter should just advise his or her clients to go out and make false 
police reports against their estranged spouses and in-laws so that the Family Law 
Commissioners have no choice but to rule against those accused. Let this case stand, and 
you are telling us that we have no recourse at all when people lie to the police about us. 
Should there be safe harbors for people when they make reasonable reports to 
police about reasonably suspicious activities? Well, maybe there should be — when the 
people making those reports are actually telling the truth and they really are reporting 
about "reasonably suspicious" activities. Some of the highest courts in the land are busy 
deciding that issue right now. For example, the "Flying Imams" controversy is a 
controversy concerning the removal of six Muslim imams from US Airways Flight 300, 
from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Phoenix, Arizona, at 6:30 PM on November 20, 2006. 
The removal of the Imams was initiated when several passengers, as well as crew, 
became alarmed by what they felt was suspicious behavior. "6 Imams Removed From 
Flight for Behavior Deemed Suspicious" The New York Times 22 November 2006. 
"About Those Imams", Richard Miniter, New York Post, December 2, 2006. 
However, this present case is not about reasonably reporting reasonably suspicious 
activities. This case is about the improprieties of the people that use the criminal process 
to gain advantage in the family courts and the improprieties of the attorneys and in some 
cases even the courts, which encourage this sort of behavior. 
I believe when our forefathers made the constitution and set up the legal system, it 
was to provide a system whereby the parties would have a forum to tell the truth, gather 
all the information before making a decision, and that the evidence and truth would stand 
to prevail. 
Elements: A cause of action for [malicious prosecution] abuse of process 
requires pleading and proof of two elements: (1) the use of legal process 
primarily to accomplish a purpose not within the scope of the proceeding 
for which it was designed; and (2) malice. 
On the Appellees1 issue of whether Appellant failed to Marshal evidence, 
Appellees did attempt to explain the law in their "Issues Presented for Review" section of 
their brief. Appellant's Brief pg. 1-3. But then in their argument, beginning on page 34 
of their brief, Appellees used the marshalling inquiry as an excuse to remain 
unresponsive to any of Appellant's issues. 
The fatal flaw of their "marshalling" inquiry in Appellee's brief, however, was 
adding extra elements to place a jtiigher burden on Plaintiffs seeking redress against a 
private citizen who intentionally lies to police. A malicious prosecution case brought by 
one private citizen against another is not a civil abuse of process claim, nor is it 
government's immunity case. This was a case where the Defendants (Appellee's) 
purposefully lied to the Police just to get a police action started and to use that to their 
advantage in a child custody matter. The "instituted and continued" analysis was the 
wrong analysis and for all practical purposes set the burden of proof in a malicious 
prosecution of one private citizen against another at an unattainable level whatever the 
fact? in the case may be. 
Under the "instituted and continued" analysis, the Plaintiff bringing a malicious 
prosecution case against a private citizen would necessarily have to prove a conspiracy 
theory with the police or prosecutors where some undue influence had to be placed upon 
a government official capable of continuing the prosecution. The result of that analysis 
would literally mean that people are just free to make false police reports any time they 
want. Then they could gather support from family members who could also make and 
corroborate false police reports. 
These "instituted and continued" analyses should not be made law. There has to 
be some redress for the aggrieved parties and Trial Courts hearing the matter must allow 
us to present some evidence of the relationships among and between parties which is 
where the motive and malice lies. Appellees were "artful" in their analysis because if you 
return to the Appellants brief, I argued in my brief that it was the Trial Court that had 
disallowed evidence and had insufficient evidence for its findings, not the other way 
around. It was the Trial Court that lacked any evidence to rebut the Plaintiffs 
contentions of two key facts: 1) purposefully lying to police, 2) with malice. The two 
elements of a malicious prosecution of one private citizen against another are not the 
same as maintaining a malicious prosecution against a government official. Plaintiff 
(Appellant) had marshaled evidence at the Trial Court, that all Defendants had 
purposefully lied to the Police in order to "help their family" member in her divorce and 
custody case. Additionally, every time Plaintiff (Appellant) tried to enter evidence at trial 
of the relationships between Defendants as motive and malice, the "instituted and 
continued" analysis got in the way. 
It was the Trial Court that added additional elements to an abuse of process cause 
of action. In other words* there was a "fatal" flaw in the lower courts ruling on that 
issue: Judge Taylor summarized the law where State's governmental immunity would 
have been involved. But in this case, there was no governmental immunity issue because 
this was malicious prosecution case, an abuse of process claim, not against a government 
official, but against private citizens and the Honorable Judge's "instituted or continued" 
analyses were flawed. 
In the Appellee's brief, they again stated some conclusion of law as announced by 
the Court in Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah 1999) which was a case about a civil 
action where an attorney "brought suit against defendants, alleging they had wrongfully 
used civil proceedings in filing and maintaining a malpractice action against her." Gilbert 
v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841, 842 (Utah 1999). In Gilbert, the Utah Supreme Court did an 
excellent job of explaining the differences between a civil "abuse of process" and 
criminal "malicious prosecution" Id. 845, 846. 
But the Appellee's logic in their Brief and Judge Taylor's at the Trial Court in this 
case, still suffered from a primary flaw in that lying to police for a purpose to gain 
advantage in a divorce and child custody matter was clearly never rebutted at Trial, nor 
was it rejected as Fact that all the Defendants did actually lie to the police. Under the 
incorrect "instituted and continued" analysis, lying to the police became immaterial to the 
Trial Judge's decision. 
Attorneys for the Defendants at Trial did even stipulate to a proffer of a Bailiff s 
testimony who closely monitored the alleged actions which were at issue in the Trial 
Court. The Bailiff would have testified that "she was standing in close proximity to the 
parties and that she saw no contact. Further that when the parties started talking, she 
moved in close to them." (Tr. 148, 150) see also Appellee's Brief, pg 23. 
First it was improper of the Judge to not allow the Bailiffs actual testimony. 
Second, it was improper to take the testimony under proffer. But third, after Defendant's 
stipulated to the proffer, they in turn stipulated to the fact that all defendants had actually 
lied. Similarly, with police officer Arochis's proffered testimony (who was to testify that 
Defendant (Appellee) Mayna Fuller did in fact make such an identification to the police 
that the truck she had alleged was "stalking" her was driven by the Appellant) — an 
identification which ultimately turns out to be false is a key element of a private citizen 
malicious prosecution case. Judge Taylor responded that he had "heard counsel's proffer 
as to Officer Arochis" and that Attorneys for Appellees (Defendants) did not object to 
those proffers. The witness was noticed to the Court and opposing counsel at least thirty 
days prior to trial that he would be available as rebuttal witnesses at trial should the 
Defendants (Appellees) present any evidence to the contrary that they had lied to police. 
There was no such evidence to rebut Plaintiffs (Appellant's) contention that 
Defendants (Appellees) had lied to police. No evidence by Appellees was ever presented 
at Trial because the court had already established that lying to the police for a purpose to 
obtain legal process primarily to accomplish a result not within the scope of the 
proceeding for which it was designed was (according to the Trial Court) "not sufficient9' 
to maintain the claim. The issue of lying to the police was merely dismissed by the Court 
as insufficient. 
If the Trial Court Judge had allowed the Jury by trial and had not erroneously 
added the "instituted and continued" analysis, the Jury could have decided whether the 
Defendants (Appellees) had lied to the police. Since there was no jury and the 
Defendants (Appellees) had stipulated to the proffers, it became stipulated fact that 
Defendants (Appellees) had lied to the police. 1) Lying to police and 2) for a purpose to 
gain advantage in a divorce and custody matter — were pieces of evidence which were 
marshaled at the Trial Court. 
Rule 38 Demand: Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable 
of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the 
other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the 
commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of 
the last pleading directed to such issue. 
The clear text of the Rule 38, U.R.C.P, as stated above says 1) pay the fee and 
2)serve upon the other parties a demand within 10 days after service of the pleading. It 
does not say pay the fee within 10 days and then serve within 10 days; nor does it say pay 
the fee and serve, both within 10 days. It clearly says pay the fee and serve a demand 
within 10 days. The meaning of the rule is clear and unambiguous. Various states have 
enacted various ways of dealing with this jury demand issue and the Utah legislation was 
no different and is unambiguous on its requirements. 
The Trial Court got it wrong. Now, this honorable Court must first analyze the 
clear and unambiguous meaning of the statute before proceeding with any other analyses. 
The only other possible analysis would be the "absurd results" analysis, which clearly is 
not the case here. 
"Normally, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, our analysis 
ends; our duty is to give effect to that plain meaning. However^ "[a]n equally well-settled 
caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language 
of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result." Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004 
UT 102, % 18, 104 P.3d 1242. The absurd results canon of statutory construction 
recognizes that although "the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust 
presumption in its favor, it is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every instance, 
be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it said." FBI v. 
Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)." State ex rel Z.C 2007 
UTSC 20060096 - 071707 (July 17, 2007); quoting from Savage v. Utah Youth Vill and 
FBI v. Abramson. 
Honorable Judges, if your mother told you to eat all your dinner and wash your 
plate in the sink, she did not mean eat your dinner in the sink. That would be the absurd. 
Likewise, in this case, the meaning of the Rule is clear and this court's analysis 
must end there. The legislature meant what it meant. The Appellee's brief offered no 
consideration of legislative intent and offered no reasoning that this Court of Appeals 
should analyze legislative intent differently. Therefore, the clear meaning of the statute 
only requires that the fee be paid and the demand served within 10 days. 
Furthermore, some fees (all that were requested) were paid at the time of the filing 
of the case at the Trial Court. While it may have been argued at trial as to which fees 
were paid at the outset and which fees were not, no such evidence or arguments were 
ever made as to which fees were paid and when. It was the Defendants (Appellees) who 
have failed to marshal any evidence as to the break down of the fees paid and the clear 
meaning of the statute should have been followed in this case. 
Court Records and Trial Court Transcript: Appellant Referred either to the 
Court Transcript or the Court Record to establish all of his arguments. 
Appellees purposely attempted to distract the Court by alleging in their brief that 
Appellant's brief failed to refer to the Trial. In actuality, Appellant's brief referred to the 
record as a basis for every argument either by citing to the transcript or the record. The 
Trial Court Record includes: 
"(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial 
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in 
the following order: 
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet; 
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and 
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report." Rule 11 (b) 
U.R. App. Pro. 
So, Appellants can and did refer to more than just the transcript at trial. Appellant 
argues that it is allowed to refer to anything in the record. 
Appellee's Material Misrepresentations to The Trial Court and Court of 
Appeals: Attorneys for Appellees instituted a fraud against the justice 
system by declaring to the Trial Court that Defendant Krik Myers was not 
represented by any of the Attorneys for the Appellees (Defendants), yet in 
their appeal brief the attorneys affirmatively state that they were Attorneys 
for the Appellee (Defendant) Krik Myers at Trial. Attorney's for the 
Appellees should turn over to the Court immediately the Address and/or 
last know whereabouts of Appellee Krik Myers and appropriate sanctions 
should be imposed for purposefully misrepresenting material facts at Trial. 
In the Appellee's brief they referred to the testimony of Sam Banks, Matthew 
Hilton, Jonathan Fuller, Mayna Fuller, Ruth Fuller, Dennis Sunday, Teresa Sunday, 
Raylynn Sly. If this Court would like to go their the Trial transcript, it will tell you what 
they said, however where is the testimony and discovery of Krik Myers? 
After all Plaintiff (Appellant) has gone through, we first find out in the Appellee's 
brief that he was represented by counsel. Is there not some law against attorneys 
withholding evidence and tampering with the system to gain unfair advantage in the 
outcome? 
I, the Plaintiff (Appellant), was the one who came prepared at Trial with a video 
from the court room where the alleged assault occurred. The video doesn't show what 
the Appellees are claiming, but it does show Mr. Myers wearing a thick wool type 
sweater that was made of nylon, rayon or acrylic materials. The tape also shows that no 
one was touched, hurt or feared for their lives. But the Defendant Krik Myers wasn't 
there to testify. He failed at every point in this case to even show up. He defaulted by 
every meaning of the word and now finally at this stage in the process, the attorney for 
the Appellees wants to finally make an appearance and take ownership of Mr. Krik 
Myer's defense. 
If Rose Blakelock was the Attorney for Krik Myers, then they have committed 
fraud in the Discovery Process. Mr. Myers had made a statement to the police. That fact 
was clearly established at trial. One of those statements to the police was that he had a 
doctors appointment right after the hearing on the day in question, so in discovery we 
had asked for the doctor's report and pictures of the bruises. Since Krik was 
conveniently unavailable at Trial with everyone else acting as if they had no idea of his 
whereabouts, those questions could never be answered. Now, evidently, Attorney 
Blakelock, in the Appellant's brief wants to argue for the first time that she in fact has 
been Krik's Attorney the whole time. 
Where does the behavior stop on lies? It is hard to believe that Attorney Rose G. 
Blakelock apparently forgot to mention her role with Mr. Myers. She purposely held all 
discoveries and deliberately hampered the prosecution of this case along with hiding Mr. 
Myers from the trial. Judge Taylor would not allow other important information in 
concerning the relationship of Mr. Myers with Mayna Fuller, another Defendant in this 
case, which hampered our abilities to show motive and malice also affecting the outcome 
at trial. Contempt of court should have been entered on Appellees and council, they did 
not follow the procedures pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah R. Civ P. providing discovery. 
Expenses and sanctions could and could have been granted under Rule 37 (a) (4). But 
the attorneys for Defendants maintained this fraud against the Court the whole time and 
now had the gall to claim finally in their brief that they were representing Mr. Krik Myers 
the whole time. 
Attorney's for the Defendant's did include certificate of service on many of their 
filings with the lower court, which included Krik's name and address as a separate party. 
It was the same name and address given to us by Krik Myers and each time I used that 
address, the mail came back undeliverable. First, if they were representing Krik Myers, 
then why did they need a certificate of service for him? Second, if they were 
representing Krik Myers, then why did they send it to an address known to be bad? Both 
can't be true and since they made those mailing certificates then the attorneys have made 
misrepresentations to the court about who their clients were at the time of trial and now. 
The appellant's right for a jury trial should have been granted when complaint was 
filed because appellees did not file any motions in protest for the jury trial. Appellees 
ignored the issues of most of my appeal so they must agree with them. Instead they just 
wanted to distract the court with their irrelevant "marshalling evidence" theories. Instead 
of answering our issues they just manufactured some artfully distracting issues. 
Appellants raised the issue of ineffective counsel at hearings prior to trial 
and in their interlocutory appeal. 
Again, the entire record of this case could be referred to by Appellants. There was 
an interlocutory appeal filed in this matter and the issue of ineffective counsel had been 
raised prior to trial. Any issues in that interlocutory appeal not resolved at trial should 
still be heard on appeal. What is absurd is to suggest that prior counsel for Plaintiff 
(Appellant) had to raise the issue of his own ineffectiveness at trial. 
Appellant acting Pro Se before the Judge who required him to obtain 
counsel, prior to trial, filed a complete break down and listing of damages 
with documented proof of those damages. 
Appellant filed documents prior to trial, which were a matter of record at the time 
of trial which contained a complete break down and listing of all damages sought along 
with documented proof of those damages. The Judge knew Appellant had damages. The 
Judge knew there was proof of damages. The Judge was the one badgering Plaintiff 
(Appellant's) former attorney to move on and finish his case. So, when the Judge 
announced to the Court at trial that he had heard enough to now render his decision, he 
was stating to the Court that he was satisfied that every party has had ample opportunity. 
Instead of mentioning any opportunity for damages, the Honorable Judge Taylor 
had a moment of sly sedition to where even a slight smile appeared on his face as 
informed the attorney, his time to argue damages has passed." The Judge knew fair well 
that there were damages, but would not allow the attorney to plead proof of damages. 
What if there had been a jury, what would his instructions on damages have been 
to the jury? We can never know. The error was not harmless error. A judgment need 
not contain a recital of the pleadings, but the entire court record is subject to review by 
the Judge in rendering his decision. See U.R.C.P R. 54. 
Respectfully submitted this 9 day of ?S^F**SI?*t 2007 
David Fuller, Appellant Pro se 
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